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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
a. Economic, social and cultural rights in armed conflict 
 
Armed conflicts have the potential to decimate communities, not just through the death, injury and 
destruction that are observable in the immediate aftermath of an attack but through the undermining of 
societal integrity as a whole. The economic, social and cultural (ESC) well-being of individuals and 
entire populations may be impeded in such a manner that the first-tier harms of conflict cascade and 
compound with existing vulnerabilities. Particularly in protracted armed conflicts where community 
resilience is especially depleted, the effects of an attack may be amplified, as services and 
infrastructure, such as medical facilities and water supply networks, are weakened or destroyed.1 
Conflicts ranging from eastern Ukraine,2 to the Democratic Republic of Congo3 and the Gulf Wars,4 
among many others, have demonstrated that impacts on the ESC rights of a community are capable of 
causing greater harm than the first-tier impacts of a military attack. Whilst discussions on the application 
of international human rights law (IHRL) in armed conflict have largely centred around civil and political 
rights,5 the relevance of ESC rights in conflict is undeniable. IHRL has been designed to include specific 
protections for these fundamental features of human life, ranging from the right to health, work, an 
adequate standard of living including access to food, clothing, water and housing, as well as the right 
to physical and mental health, social security, a healthy environment and education among other such 
rights.6 In their entirety, armed conflicts can impede and infringe on the realisation of each right across 
this list. 
 
The scope of ESC rights in conflict should be given specific attention, not only due to the significant 
humanitarian cost of infractions, but also due to the instability that arises from the failure to respect ESC 
                                               
1 Graham, S., Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism, (London: Verso, 2010), pp.263-264. 
2 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, PAX, ‘Operating under Fire Cover: The Effects of 
Explosive Weapons on Health Care in the East of Ukraine,’ Report, May 2017, p.1.  
3 Burnet Institute, International Rescue Committee, ‘Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing 
Crisis’, Report, May 2007, p.14. 
4 Cronin, B., Bugsplat: the politics of collateral damage in western armed conflicts (Oxford University Press, 
2018)., p.143 
5 Mottershaw, E., ‘Economic, social and cultural rights in armed conflict: International human rights law and 
international humanitarian law,’ International Journal of Human Rights, (2008) 12(3), pp.449-470, p.449. 
6 See UNGA, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 
993, p. 3, (hereafter ‘ICESCR’). 
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rights can result in the outbreak of further conflict in due course.7 In this sense, attempts to incorporate 
the protection of ESC rights can enhance military objectives of enhancing peace and stability within a 
region.8  
 
In recognising the harms that arise from conflict, and the need to protect the ESC integrity of the 
population in times of conflict, international humanitarian law (IHL) has incorporated a number of 
essential protections into its remit. Provisions covering the protection of cultural property,9 prohibitions 
on the starvation of the civilian population,10 and the respect for medical personnel and facilities11 
amongst other such concerns populate the laws of war. However, the IHL regime that covers these 
issues does so in a piecemeal fashion, utilising discrete and often extremely specific provisions. It is 
here that IHRL can potentially confer a wider level of protection, diffused across the law of armed conflict 
as a whole. 
 
Nevertheless, where the guiding legal frameworks overlap within conflict settings, the question of how 
ESC rights apply in practice in conflict settings is unclear.12 This thesis will place a particular focus on 
ESC rights in active hostilities, namely, within military targeting practices, as this remains one of the 
areas in which the legal frameworks of IHL and IHRL will contain the greatest divergence. However, it 
will be argued that IHRL in relation to ESC rights will help to hone our understanding of the scope of 
military obligations under the law of targeting, with an emphasis on the reverberating effects of attacks, 
where considerable ambiguity remains, and ESC rights can provide a meaningful contribution. It should 
be noted that while the application of ESC rights outside of active hostilities, particularly within situations 
of occupation, are of great importance, they will be largely outside the scope of the present work. 
  
                                               
7 OHCHR, ‘Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Conflict,’ Report, 2015, p.2. 
8 Wille, C., ‘Implications of the Reverberating Effects of Explosive Weapons Use in Populated Areas for 
Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals,’ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR), 2016, p.1. 
9 See: ICRC Customary IHL: Rules 38, 39 & 40, accessible at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul. 
10 See: CRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, (henceforth ‘API’), Article 54(1). 
11 See: ICRC Customary IHL: Rules 25, 26 28, 29, 35, accessible at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul. 
12 Mottershaw, note 5, pp.464-465. 
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Chapter 2 - The Protection of ESC rights in IHL 
a. How does IHL protect ESC rights? 
IHL, as a whole, provides a legal framework to limit and ameliorate the impacts of conflict. In this sense, 
IHL paves the path to limit the destruction of infrastructure and other objects essential to the realisation 
of ESC rights within conflict zones. As such, IHL can assist States in meeting their obligations to realise 
ESC rights through the recovery of the area from conflict and the continued functioning of services.13 
Further, IHL helps to guarantee the substance - if not the label - of ESC rights through a variety of more 
specific provisions. These provisions address ‘aspects or components’ of substantive ESC rights, such 
as access to adequate food, water and sanitation, education, health, social security, work and 
employment, protection of the family, protection of natural resources, protection of the environment, 
and the right to take part in the cultural life of the community.14 However, ESC considerations can be 
severely impacted beyond the immediate temporal realm of the attack. The knock-on effects of an attack 
(i.e. the secondary or tertiary impacts that may not be immediately realised) can echo throughout the 
operational environment, causing widespread harm. This is particularly the case in regard to 
infrastructure, ‘an underlying issue that affects everything,’15 and is essential for a number of core ESC 
rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living and to health. As these knock-on effects 
manifest after the initial attack, the question arises as to how they are captured within the current IHL 
provisions. Additionally, IHL is distinct from IHRL, and despite the aforementioned protections, it can 
also allow for serious infringements of human rights in certain circumstances. From this point, it is 
necessary to understand the nature of the law of targeting within IHL, which acts as one of the primary 
arenas in which such infringements may occur.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Giacca, G., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p.174 
14 Ibid, pp.173-4 
15 Weinthal, E. & Sowers, J., ‘Targeting infrastructure and livelihood in the West Bank and Gaza’ (2019) 95:2, 
International Affairs, 319-340, p.321. 
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b. The law of targeting under IHL 
The law of targeting underlines military activities in active hostilities, representing the strictures on the 
process of applying combat power to disable, degrade or harass enemy capabilities16 in an attempt to 
achieve the strategic interests of the military operation.17 Whilst international humanitarian law 
recognises the right of military actors to use legitimate violence to achieve these strategic interests, the 
law of targeting also acts to embed humanitarian concerns into military attacks.  In this respect, it 
demands that military actors endeavour to distinguish between combatants and civilians not directly 
participating in hostilities, and between military and civilian objects.18 Moreover, a number of provisions 
help to restrain the resultant harms, such as limitations on the targeting of works and installations 
containing dangerous forces,19 or restrictions on the means and methods of warfare, such as those 
causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering even where the intended victim is a hostile 
combatant.20 Given the general clarity of these specific provisions, this thesis will focus on 
proportionality assessments and precautionary measures within targeting processes where ambiguity 
remains. 
 
It is important to note that the rules of targeting contained within Additional Protocol I (henceforth ‘API’ 
or ‘the Protocol’) are recognised as part of customary international law, applicable in land, air and naval 
warfare (though targeting at sea entails additional rules that are outside the scope of the present work).21 
Resultantly, they remain applicable regardless of whether a State is party to API, and apply in 
international and non-international armed conflicts alike. 
 
 i. Proportionality assessments 
 
API appreciates that conflict will likely involve some degree of incidental harm and damage to civilian 
objects, and as such, incidental harm does not in-and-of-itself render the attack unlawful.22 The 
                                               
16 Corn, G., & Corn, G., ‘The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens,’ 
(2011) 47: 2, Texas International Law Journal, 337-380, p.342. 
17 Boothby, W.H., The Law of Targeting, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.4. 
18 Ibid, p.6. 
19 API, Article 56. 
20 API, Article 35(2). 
21 Schmitt, M, ‘Targeting in Operational Law’ in Gill, T.D., & Fleck, D. (eds.) The Handbook of the International 
Law of Military Operations (2nd edn.). Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2015), p.270. 
22 Boothby, note 17, p.94. 
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permission of incidental harm is not, however, unlimited. The Protocol demands that incidental harms 
which ‘may be expected’ as a result of a military attack are balanced with the anticipated concrete and 
direct military advantage, and rendered unlawful where the attack causes disproportionate civilian harm 
in comparison to the military advantage.23 Whilst the scope of such advantages is contested,24 there is 
agreement that military advantages should be ‘concrete and perceptible’ rather than merely ‘speculative 
and hypothetical.’25 Any calculation of military advantage that is removed from the operational and 
tactical aspects of an attack will become increasingly more speculative and hypothetical, disallowing 
the tenuous advantage for the purpose of the assessment. Despite contestations,26 more permissive 
interpretations that allow for the victory of the military campaign as a whole to be interpreted as the 
advantage are generally agreed to be prohibited within this provision, to limit justifications of civilian 
harm.27 
 
While the proportionality equation provides a useful framework for prohibiting clearly disproportionate 
attacks, it is less useful in instances where the proportionality of the attack is less obvious. 
Proportionality assessments contain an inherently subjective component,  as there remains no objective 
manner for measuring the ‘value’ of military advantage against the harm caused to civilians.28 
Resultantly, the proportionality principle can be seen as of somewhat limited utility in finding violations 
of IHL after the fact, though it acts to instil humanitarian concerns within the targeting process and as 
such, is of great procedural value. Therefore, many of the benefits that arise from proportionality 
assessments are derived from the ability to direct the targeting decision-maker’s mind towards civilian 
harm and development of procedures to be able to conduct the assessment in the first instance. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
23 API, Article 51(5)(b). 
24 Goodman, R., ‘The Obama Administration and Targeting War-Sustaining Object in Non-international Armed 
Conflict, ’ (2016) American Journal of International Law, 110:4, 663-679, p.679. 
25 King, I., ‘The Legality of Attacking War-Sustaining Economic Objects,’ (2018) Stanford Journal of International 
Law, 54:1, 49-82, p.56. 
26 Ibid, pp.60-61. 
27 Jachec-Neale, A.,The Concept of Military Objectives in International Law and Targeting Practice, (Hoboken: 
Taylor&Francis, 2014), p.117. 
28 Boothby, note 17, p.96. 
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ii. Precautionary measures  
 
The Protocol outlines a number of precautionary measures to be undertaken by attackers during military 
targeting.29 Reiterating the core concerns of the principle of distinction contained within Article 48, Article 
57(1) demands that ‘constant care [is] taken’ to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects’ in ‘the conduct of military operations’. For the purposes of Article 57, military operations appear 
to refer to the use of force as opposed to ‘ideological, religious, or political campaigns.’30 The remaining 
provisions within Article 57 delineate necessary measures for the practical realisation of this principle.31  
 
Importantly, in relation to article 57(1), the obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian 
population is not directed at a specific group of personnel involved in the conduct of military operations. 
From here, the question remains of whether the entailing obligations are diffused throughout the 
targeting process. 
 
With respect to Article 57(2), discussion has arisen on the level of command at which these obligations 
manifest.32 At the time of ratification, Switzerland held that article 57(2) creates an obligation for 
commanders at battalion level or higher, excluding the lower levels of command due to the assertion 
that they would not have the requisite level of information.33 Whilst Rogers holds that the level of 
command at which the obligations arise is dependent on the context of the operation when read in its 
wider sense,34 Dinstein argues that the primary obligation to ensure that the military is targeting a 
military objective ‘devolves on relatively high echelons’ as they have the necessary level of 
information.35 The ICRC’s commentary on API, however, holds that an obligation exists on the military 
high command to provide sufficient instruction to lower ranks so that they may comply with the 
obligation.36 By locating the core of the responsibility at the higher level, this interpretation recognises 
                                               
29 API, Article 57. 
30 Boothby, note 17,p.119. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Boothby, note 17 , p.119. 
34 Rogers, A.P.V., Law on the battlefield, (2nd edn.) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.28-9. 
35 Dinstein, Y., The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, (2nd edn.), (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.140. 
36 ICRC, API Commentary, section 2197. 
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that lower level commanders will be unable to balance factors that they are not privy to,37 and can be 
read as requiring a greater level of caution at the strategic as opposed to the tactical level. 
 
Nevertheless, Article 57(2) is directed at those ‘who plan or decide upon an attack,’ seemingly extending 
the obligation across all ranks. Boothby holds that this phrase ‘would seem to include, inter alia, anyone 
who fires a weapon as part of the attack, anyone who directs a munition such as a rocket; missile, or 
bomb, anyone who plans the attack at the tactical level, those on whose orders the panicular attack 
proceeds, and those who approve the attack plan.’38 This provides a potentially broad remit for the 
precautionary measures’ obligations. 
 
Whilst containing a number of obligations, such as the verification of objects, and the obligation to give 
warnings, Article 57(2)(a)(ii), (iii) and (b) are of particular importance in relation to the protection of the 
ESC rights of the civilian population. Though it does not forbid the infliction of harm to the civilian 
population, it does attempt to temper it. In this sense, armed groups hold the obligation to undertake 
feasible precautions in the choice of the means and methods of attack to avoid or mitigate incidental 
civilian harm, and refrain from, suspend or cancel attacks that would cause disproportionate harm to 
the civilian population. Whilst leaving room for the discretion on the manner by which armed groups 
action this obligation, it may affect decisions on the choice of weapons, timing of the attack and the 
choice of targeted object in order to safeguard the civilian population from harm. However, by 
demanding ‘feasible’ precautions, the provision does recognise a limit to the measures to be taken. For 
instance, due to expense and supply considerations, militaries will be unable to use precision weapons 
in every instance, and issues such as urgency will determine the extent of the precautionary checks to 
be made.39 
  
c. Reverberating effects in IHL – interpretations 
 
Though the direct infliction of death, injury, destruction and damage provides a visible and potentially 
immediate manifestation of the harms of military attacks, the impacts on ESC rights can result in 
                                               
37 Boothby, note 17, p.120. 
38 Id. 
39 Boothby, note 17, p.124. 
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considerable suffering as highlighted above. Nevertheless, these impacts may be less obvious in the 
immediate moment as the negative impacts may only arise over time or through the cumulative effect 
of attacks over a sustained period of time.40 Certainly, as demonstrated in the attacks on Iraqi electrical 
power systems the first Gulf War41, the longer-term impacts of an attack may result in higher rates of 
death, injury and damage to civilian property than the immediate impacts. Increasingly, international 
attention has come to address these issues,42 by referring to the ‘reverberating effects’ of an attack, 
namely the effects ‘that are not directly and immediately caused by the attack, but are nevertheless the 
product thereof.’43  
 
The  obligation to take the reverberating effects of an attack into account under IHL remains vague in 
terms of its nature and scope, resulting in a number of divergent and competing interpretations. 
Therefore, in attempting to achieve clarity on the existing legal obligations one must look towards the 
treaty itself as well as the growing body of State practice, which breath life into the Protocol. This section 
will address how the reverberating effects of an attack are considered within the law of targeting in 
armed conflict. 
 
i. Legal basis of the law of targeting in IHL 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) stipulates that the starting point for treaty 
interpretation will always be the  good faith interpretation of the provision in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms contained, in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.44 From the outset, this 
appears to clearly require the consideration of reverberating effects, though notably, the scope of these 
obligations, again, remains unclear. This responsibility arises from the inclusion of the phrase ‘may be 
expected’ contained within Articles 51 and 57. The drafters of the Protocol refrained from including any 
specific procedural, spatial or temporal limitations - and in fact expressly rejected language which would 
                                               
40 Robinson, I., & Nohle, E., ‘Proportionality and precautions in attack: The reverberating effects of using 
explosive weapons in populated areas’, (2016) International Review of the Red Cross, 98(1), 107-146, p.108. 
41 Crawford, J., ‘The Law of Non-combatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems,’ 
(1997) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 21(2), 101- 120, p.110. 
42 Robinson & Nohle, note 40, p.108. 
43 Schmitt, M., ‘Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello’, (2002), International Review of the 
Red Cross, 84(846), 365-400, p.392. 
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS, Vol. 1155, (hereafter ‘VCLT’)Article 31(1). 
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have restricted incidental harms to those within the immediate vicinity of the military objective.45 As 
such, the drafters left the the wider harms of an attack within the purview of the provisions. Resulting 
from this, attempts to confine the remit of relevant effects can appear somewhat artificial. 
 
Further, as per the VCLT, when interpreting a treaty, the context of the treaty will also help to determine 
how it is to be read, taking account of its object and purpose, and the headings and chapeau provisions 
contained within the Protocol.46. In doing so, the humanitarian purpose of API will be significant in 
ensuring an interpretation with as wide an ambit as possible for any provision that acts to protect 
civilians in armed conflict situations. This is particularly evident within the heading of Article 51, entitled 
‘Protection of the Civilian Population,’ which holds that civilians ‘shall enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations.’ As well as this, Article 57, within the text of the provision itself, 
contains a clear humanitarian objective, requiring ‘constant care’ to ‘spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects,’ pushing armed actors to  the ultimate ambition of avoiding any harm to 
civilians.47 Within the context of the Protocol, Articles 51 and 57 are placed in proximity with provisions 
which more explicitly contain protections against the reverberating effects of an attack. Article 54 seeks 
to protect objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and in doing so 
prohibits the attack, destruction, removal or rendering essential objects such as food stuffs, agricultural 
areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water-installations and supplies and 
irrigation works where they are targeted to deny them for sustenance to the civilian population or to the 
adverse party.48  This provision is inherently tied to the second and third-tier effects of an attack as 
opposed to the immediate incidental harms that result from the attack on the object itself. In this respect, 
the temporal features of this provision are expansive, as it directly considers issues such as the civilian 
population’s migration from the area, a repercussion that may take time to materialise following the 
impacts on the objects outlined within the provision.49 Moreover, the desire to include long term effects 
is reflected within Article 56 which seeks to protect works and installations containing dangerous forces, 
contains a similar focus on the humanitarian impacts of targeting. Setting out an exhaustive list of works 
                                               
45 Bothe, M. et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), para. 2.6.2. 
46 VCLT, Article 31(2). 
47 Kalshoven, F., & Zegveld, L., Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian 
Law, (4th edn.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.113. 
48 API, Article 54(2) 
49 ICRC, ‘Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Humanitarian, Legal, Technical and Military Aspects. 
Switzerland: Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting in Chavannes‐ de‐ Bogis,’ Report, 2015, p.8. 
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and installations that cannot be targeted, the provision places an emphasis on the knock-on effects of 
the attack, as opposed to incidental first-tier harm collateral damage caused by the attack itself. Whilst 
it can be argued that Articles 54 and 56 represent explicitly crafted obligations that cannot be analogised 
for other provisions, they can nevertheless be used to demonstrate that the reverberating impacts on 
the civilian community were present in the minds of the drafters.  
 
ii. State practice and opinio juris 
 
As demonstrated above, textual analysis of the Protocol suggests that the obligation to include the 
reverberating effects of an attack into targeting practices exists within Articles 51 and 57. In addition to 
this, this obligation is increasingly reflected in State practice.50 The 2006 Third Review Conference on 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) heard a number of 
States emphasise the importance of considering the effects of explosive remnants of war within 
proportionality assessments, with such effects by their nature being secondary impacts.51 As a result of 
such statements, the Final Declaration of the Third Review of the CCW, which was unanimously 
accepted, held that the foreseeable effects of explosive remnants of war should be factored into 
proportionality assessments and precautionary measures.52 Ultimately bolstered by the similar 
language within the Amended Protocol II of the CCW which explicitly addressed the need to account 
for long-effects within Article 3(10)(a), this demonstrates that there is a strong international consensus 
that reverberating effects must be incorporated into targeting practices. 
 
Additionally, reflecting the weight of expert opinion, the ICRC Expert Meeting of States on the use of 
explosive weapons in populated areas heard a number of States support the position that commanders 
must take the foreseeable reverberating effects of an attack into account, though notably the practical 
challenges, such as quantifying the long-term effects of an attack, were voiced.53 Several participants 
expressed support for the view that commanders must take into account the foreseeable reverberating 
                                               
50 Robinson & Nohle, note 40, p.115. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 ICRC, note 49,  p.23. 
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effects of an attack, but noted the practical challenges in complying with this obligation, particularly the 
difficulty of quantifying the long-term effects of an attack. In this respect, one participant cautioned 
against setting a single standard that would apply in all circumstances. While agreeing that what is 
foreseeable is not limited in time or space, another participant stressed that it is limited to what is 
practically foreseeable in the circumstances ruling at the time of the attack.54 
 
A number of military manuals have outlined the need to consider impacts that go beyond the immediate 
first-tier harms resulting from an attack. For instance, the UK military’s Joint Service Manual states that 
any assessment of whether an attack is proportionate should involve the consideration of the 
foreseeable effects of an attack by the relevant commander, citing an example that contains second-
tier impacts of the destruction of a military fuel storage depot on the civilian population.55 Similarly, the 
US has produced manuals which refer to the need to consider ‘second and third-order effects’ of 
attacks56 and, along with the Spanish manual,57 referred to the ‘foreseeable’ effects of an attack, 
avoiding language that would appear to create causal, geographic or temporal limitations.58 However, 
it is notable that the most military manuals merely echo the language of the Protocol’s provisions with 
no specific reference to the foreseeability of the effects.59 
  
iii. Determining the scope of the obligation to account for the reverberating effects  
 
The challenge arising from the need to take the reverberating effects of an attack into consideration 
revolves around the standard of foreseeability. The cascading effects can continue indefinitely and 
ricochet across space and time in ways that are unpredictable. However, in order to establish clear and 
practical guidelines on the rules of proportionality and precautionary measures, a relatively definite 
standard is necessary. There are various ways in which this can be approached, each resulting in 
capturing a seperate array of reverberating effects. Moreover, an additional consideration remains, 
namely, the degree to which there is an obligation to actively expand one’s knowledge of the effects of 
                                               
54 Id. 
55 UK Ministry of Defence, the Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, JSP 383, 2004, amended in 
2013, para. 5.33.4. 
56 US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, section 7-36. 
57 Spain, Ministry of Defence, Orientaciones: El derecho de los conflictos armados, OR7-004, 18 March 1996, 
Vol. 1, para. 2.5. 
58 US Department of Defence, Law of War Manual, 2015, p.342, note 158. 
59 See ICRC Customary Law Study: State Practice, Rule 14. 
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an attack. Such a concern is pertinent, as proactive obligations may prevent militaries from 
circumventing the need to conduct full proportionality assessment by keeping themselves intentionally 
in the dark, therefore limiting their knowledge on what they may expect as the result of an attack. 
 
iv. Foreseeability 
 
As highlighted above, the effects of an attack can manifest in ways that are entirely unpredictable. In 
this respect, the legal standard can attempt to exclude these unpredictable effects by having the 
obligation bite at the point that a risk is ‘foreseeable’.60 Adopting the standard of foreseeability can 
therefore provide a reasonable standard, practical and capable of operationalisation. However, such a 
standard still entails complications - namely the question of when a resulting effect be deemed as 
foreseeable? Does this arise from the subjective understanding of those involved in the targeting 
decision-making process, or from an objective test?  
 
Scholars have put forward the suggestion of a strict legal ‘but for’ test, holding that in order for an effect 
to be foreseeable, the attack must be the ‘proximate cause.’61 However, this approach has been 
criticised, in a manner that highlights a considerable flaw within the approach.62 The ‘but for’ test is  
useful when attributing blame for the cause of an effect after the fact, but provide little assistance in 
predicting the reverberating effects of an attack, therefore compromising it’s utility for decision-makers. 
Where the benefits of proportionality assessments largely arise from instilling humanitarian 
considerations within processes, an after-the-fact measurement of these harms is of limited utility. 
 
Greenwood has put forward a model by which the likelihood of an effect materialising is the central 
consideration. Under this test, an effect is deemed to be expected where it more likely to occur than 
not, i.e. that it has over a fifty percent chance of occuring.63 However, Nohle and Robinson have directed 
criticism at this approach, holding that it is an ‘overly restrictive interpretation’ of the term expected.64 In 
                                               
60 Droege, C. & Tougas, M-L., ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: Existing rules and 
need for further legal protection’ (2013) Nordic Journal of International Law, 82(1), 21-52, p.30. 
61 Schmitt, M., et al, Computers and War: the legal battlespace, background paper prepared for the Informal 
High-level expert meeting on Current challenges to international humanitarian law, Cambridge, 25-27 June 2004, 
p.9. 
62 Robinson & Nohle, note 40, p.118. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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arguing against this suggestion they posit that Greenwood’s approach could potentially ignore 
significant risks. In this respect, if potential harms that have a forty nine percent chance of occurring are 
excluded from the proportionality equation, the assessment is reduced to an absurdity.65 For this 
reason, setting the threshold as ‘reasonable causality’ that is able to include foreseeable harms that are 
expected to arise appears to be a more sensical standard.66  
 
v. Objective/Subjective 
 
Reverberating effects can be particularly nebulous in their manifestation, requiring detailed technical 
and expert knowledge on the nature of infrastructure, for instance,  which would appear to support the 
need for objective analysis.67 However, the nature of the proportionality test (given the need to balance 
two considerations with metrics that are not directly convertible) and the need for practical and realisable 
standards within active hostility settings leads itself towards more subjective determinations.  
 
The ICRC Commentary on Article 57 lends support to the objective approach, recognising that whilst 
there is a degree of subjectivity, ‘the interpretation must above all be a question of common sense and 
good faith for military commanders.’68 In this respect, Sassóli argues that ‘common sense’ and ‘good 
faith for military commanders’ create objective standards for use in any proportionality assessment.69 
Support of an objective reasonability test has been iterated by scholars and included within the 2001 
Canadian Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict.70 Further, the argument that an objective standard 
should be utilised is somewhat inherent in the provision itself. By using the phrase ‘may be expected’ 
the provision uses language that is not specific to an individual actor, but appears to apply to what may 
be expected more generally - seemingly pointing towards an objective standard. 
 
What is important in regard to the reverberating effects of an attack is that the complexity of their 
manifestation may mean that commanders are nevertheless held to a higher standard, particularly, as 
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argued by Sassóli and Cameron, ‘a reasonable military commander, [...] aware of the 
interconnectedness of infrastructure, would be expected to foresee’ effects that may not be obvious to 
the ‘average reasonable person.’71 This, however, can still leave a significant gap. Whilst a military 
commander may have a greater level of knowledge than a lay person, they will only be able to gain this 
knowledge through specific training and experience. 
 
Supporting the position that an objective standard applies, international criminal law (ICL) case law has 
crafted the standard of a ‘reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual 
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to [them].’72 Whilst ICL, this standard 
has been accepted by IHL scholars73 and appears to reflect a great swathe of the consensus outlined 
above. Notably, however, this standard is set as that of a ‘reasonably well-informed person’ as opposed 
to a commander, who may be expected to hold be more informed in regard to the effects of an attack. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable, that ‘in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator’ may allow for the level 
of expected knowledge at the rank of the perpetrator to be accounted for. 
 
vi. Objective foresight of reverberating effects 
 
The manner by which the reverberating effects of an attack may be objectively foreseeable can include 
past experience and through the collection of empirical information. Collateral damage estimation 
methodologies (CDM), used by a number of militaries, such as the Bugsplat tool within US practice, to 
assist their targeting decision-making, rely on ‘a mix of empirical data, probability, historical 
observations, and complex modeling for analysis.’74 Whilst this will not be practically available in every 
instance of targeting, it helps to demonstrate how objective criteria can provide a strong basis for 
determining the resulting effects of an attack. 
 
Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative records of past harms can be used individually to inform the 
process. For instance, statistical data on potential reverberating effects, particularly on harms affecting 
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ESC rights such as the spread of disease can help inform the targeting process by highlighting how 
such effects have manifested in the past.75  Such methods have been vital in the international action on 
cluster munitions, as data was collected on the percentage of unexploded munitions as well as the 
reported ways in which they affect communities.76 This position has garnered support from States as 
exemplified during the third review of the CCW,  where States such as Ireland and Norway referred to 
the reliance on historical observations to guide determinations on foreseeable effects of attacks.77  
 
Further, some effects will be foreseeable through the nature of the object itself. This is particularly 
evident in regard to upstream (such as water treatment and electrical power plants) and midstream 
infrastructure (such as water reservoirs and transmission lines).78 Given the fact that such infrastructure 
is frequently identifiable and located at ground level79 the second-tier reverberating effects will be easily 
understood in an uncomplicated manner. Though the third-tier impacts such as those resulting spread 
of disease arising from their destruction or damage may be difficult to anticipate without expert 
knowledge, the resulting lack of water, for example, will be objectively foreseeable in some instances.80 
 
By utilising such information, the ability to foresee risks is eminently enhanced in an objective manner. 
In this sense, it is possible to gain a thorough understanding of effects resulting from a range of means 
and methods of warfare, in a manner that is able to accommodate the wealth of information gathered 
from militaries, international bodies and civil society organisations. 
 
vii. Positive obligation to obtain information within precautionary measures 
 
One of the core issues inherent within this discussion is the obligation to obtain additional information 
during the targeting process. This will be particularly relevant in relation to the targeting of infrastructure 
and facilities that are essential to the civilian population, or the targeting of which may result in harm, 
such as the contamination of water with sewage, for instance. As such situations may require robust 
technical analysis, not only to understand the nature of the reverberating effects, but potentially to 
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identify pertinent structures as well.81 Resultantly, the degree of the obligation to actively expand their 
information and awareness becomes of great importance. 
 
In this sense, one must consider the level of information that is required, i.e. whether the military may 
simply rely on obtaining information on the location of infrastructure, facilities and supply networks, such 
as upstream infrastructure and downstream infrastructure (such as the supply and communication 
lines).82 The ICRC, in their mission to disseminate IHL, provide training to armed and security forces, 
on the information that commanders need to acquire in order to comply with the law of targeting. They 
hold that this information must include: concentrations of civilians; civilian presence near the military 
objective, the nature of urban areas, including towns, communities and shelters; the existence and 
nature of important and protected objects; and the natural environment.83 A number of military manuals 
have incorporated this list into their own manuals, to some extent. For instance, the Australian Law of 
Armed Conflict manual iterated the need to collect ‘the best possible intelligence’ on the provided list.84 
Further, the language has been drawn upon (in part or in its entirety) by Benin, Central African Republic, 
Croatia, France, Italy, Madagascar, Nigeria, Peru, Spain and Togo.85 
 
Further, in 2010 the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, referring to operations in Gaza, outlined a number 
of measures designed to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure during operations. Here, he referred 
to the need to conduct advance research into and identification (and marking) of ‘existing infrastructure, 
including that pertaining to water, food and power supplies, sewage, health services, educational 
institutions, religious sites, economic sites, factories, stores, communications and media, and other 
sensitive sites as well as cultural institutions.’86 By creating such obligations, militaries are well 
positioned to expect effects on such objects and build protections against their harm into operations. 
 
Whilst this information is obtainable (through military intelligence or may be accessible through publicly 
available sources like the internet), it leaves the question of whether the military merely needs to 
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understand the presence of these facilities, or whether additional technical information is required on 
the likely effects of their damage or destruction. Though as highlighted above, this may be easily 
understood in some instances, at other times the ways in which effects may manifest will be 
complicated. The Tallinn Manual recognises that mission planners may not have the necessary 
expertise to understand the nature and effects of a cyber-attack on the civilian population.87 To address 
this issue, the Manual recommends the inclusion of technical experts into the decision-making and 
planning possible, where feasible, to ensure that adequate precautionary measures have been taken.88 
Moreover, it has been put forward separately that this technical expertise is a vital component within 
targeting in cyber-warfare, and that such attacks should not take place without technical guidance on 
their impacts on the civilian population.89 Boothby has similarly argued that where an attack is expected 
to damage utilities relied upon by the civilian population in an urban environment, technical expertise is 
required to assess the duration for which the related services will be compromised, and the expected 
‘damage, injury, and death civilians are likely to suffer during that period.’90 These requirements aim to 
address the gap in knowledge that may exist amongst war fighting personnel on the public health risks 
of an attack.91  
 
Certainly, this can potentially require the input and expertise of technical experts, such as public health 
officials and engineers.92 However, the source for such an obligation is difficult to identify within IHL, 
though it has been proffered by IHL scholars in the context of urban warfare.93 In practice, militaries 
have adopted such practices, such as the US army in regard to potential damage to infrastructure,94 
and have sought to build the need to develop an understanding of infrastructural systems this into their 
operational planning.95  
 
viii. How do the variables of conflict affect targeting decision-making?  
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A number of variables will be directly applicable when considering the impacts of an attack, particularly 
in the case of infrastructure and the provision of services. These issues sculpt the environment in which 
the attack will occur and, as such, will dictate how particular harms manifest as well as their severity. 
Such characteristics are therefore essential considerations for any proportionality assessment and must 
therefore be included within the precautionary measures mandated by Article 57 of the Protocol.  
 
Ultimately, this will appear as the baseline resilience of an object or, indeed, the civilian population. The 
baseline resilience will be influenced by a number of issues, and is susceptible to the compounding 
impacts of conflict, requiring a holistic assessment of the operational environment. In doing so, it is 
essential that military actors appreciate the interconnectedness of services. Utilities and healthcare are 
inherently interdependent as harm to one may reduce the ability to provide necessary services across 
the board.96 For instance, the disruption of electricity production installations, will disrupt the ability to 
provide potable water or run hospital services.97 Moreover, such vulnerabilities not only relate to the 
requirement of consumable resources as highlighted within this example, but also personnel and 
hardware, all of which may be disrupted through armed conflict.98 
 
In including such analysis within precautionary measures, Zeitoun and Talhami put forward that 
militaries can measure service resilience through ‘redundancies’ and the level of emergency 
preparedness or ability to respond.99 Here, the redundancies constitute the ability of the infrastructure 
to contain the harm to a specific area, thereby reducing geographic scope of harm and number of 
individuals affected, and allowing the ability for repairs to be conducted quickly whilst maintaining 
service, or reconfiguring the system to allow for the service to continue. Emergency preparedness and 
the ability to respond relate to the ability and time needed to restore the service to its working capacity 
once impacted. Relevant considerations to assess this relate to the presence of trained staff, the stocks 
and consumables required to replace those lost by the attack, or the level of damage or degradation of 
the stocks.100  
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The inclusion of these considerations will not only influence the number of factors to be considered 
within precautionary measures but will also influence the proportionality assessment itself. For instance, 
a protracted conflict will universally reduce the resilience of a population, through the reduction of the 
community’s ability to respond to the impacts on their services and infrastructure, through the brain 
drain of specialist staff, reduced financial capabilities, reduced access to the necessary resources, the 
compounded impacts on the integrity of the service system itself and so forth.101 These contextual 
factors will underline the reverberating effects, demonstrating how a single standard cannot be applied 
across all instances all environments, and pointing towards a need to develop a nuanced understanding 
of specific environments. 
  
d. Scope of harm  
 
Articles 51 and 57 of API refer to various forms of civilian harm that should be considered in attacks, 
namely, death, injury and damage to civilian objects. Death and damage to civilian objects are easily 
and intuitively understandable though injury remains as a more ambiguous term, as to the forms of 
injury that are captured within the provision, and the threshold of harm that is considered. This remains 
particularly relevant within the discussion of ESC rights, where the infringement of such rights does not 
necessarily involve existential threats. Ultimately, ESC rights not only concern the physical well-being 
of the population, but the wider fulfilment and dignity of the individual. In this respect, it is important to 
consider whether IHL is capable of addressing non-physical harms as a result of military operations, 
such as the integrity of an individual’s ESC development. 
 
IHL provisions which address non-survival ESC rights, including cultural and educational rights, were 
the end-product of specific deliberation and the creation of obligations uniquely tied to its specific form 
of protection. Though they indicate a wider appreciation of the impacts of conflict on the ESC well-being 
of both civilians and military personnel, this concern does not necessarily translate to the assessment 
of intangible and abstract harms affecting the wider development of the individual in proportionality 
assessments and precautionary measures. This acts to omit fundamental features of civilian well-being 
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from being factored into the proportionality equation. For instance, as argued by Henderson and Reece, 
‘neither economic harm nor the loss of employment are considered collateral damage within IHL’102 
despite the undeniable relevance for the ESC well-being of the civilian population. From here, it is 
essential to then consider the scope of the rights that would come under the ambit of the law of targeting 
within IHL. 
 
The substantive content of the term ‘injury’ for the purposes of these provisions has been largely ignored 
within military manuals and jurisprudence.103 Military manuals appear to largely echo the term ‘injury’ 
as provided for within API, but fail to flesh-out the scope of this concept, and the literature fails to expand 
on the term beyond the discussion of mental harm.104 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 remains as the only 
document that directly addresses the substance of the term ‘injury’ as contained within API, holding that 
‘it is (…) reasonable to extend the definition to serious illness and severe mental suffering that are 
tantamount to injury’.105   
 
As ESC rights include the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health,106 it is therefore necessary to analyse the scope of ‘injury’ in reference to 
this, to assess whether this includes issues such as disease and mental trauma.  
 
i. Disease 
 
The use the term injury can potentially be limiting, given that the ordinary meaning of the term appears 
to relate to wounds resulting from the attack.107 However, by reviewing the negotiating history of API, it 
appears that the drafters intended to include disease within the ambit of the provisions.108 Given the 
awareness of disease related impacts of modern weaponry, it is apparent that such impacts can be 
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distinctly tied to military attacks. For instance, it would be absurd for the proportionality assessments 
and precautionary measures to exclude the effect of toxic substances, such as depleted uranium that 
plague civilian populations following their use though they are not in all instances fatal.109  Moreover, 
the potential for the spread of disease as a result of military targeting can be high, and may arise, for 
example, from the targeting of water processing centres and sanitation facilities resulting in the increase 
in waterborne diseases.110  
 
However, when considering whether disease is included within Articles 51 and 57, it is important to 
consider whether it would be included due to their ability to cause civilian death - which acts as a central 
and obvious component of incidental harm assessments -  or whether they are intended to be included 
within the ‘injury’ component of these articles, which would allow for non-lethal illness to be considered 
particularly as no threshold for injury is outlined within the provisions. Non-lethal disease can severely 
impact civilian well-being, in a similar or even more severely than physical wounds. In this sense, the 
exclusion of disease from the ambit of the provision would mean that important humanitarian 
considerations are insufficiently captured and considered should a minor scratch be considered to the 
exclusion of an emergent serious disease.  
 
Given the humanitarian purpose of API, particularly within Article 51 and 57 as highlighted above, the 
exclusion of disease from its ambit would signify a large gap within the Protocol. One can see an 
intention to protect individuals from such harm through IHL as a whole. It is possible to identify a desire 
to treat injury and disease as a single concept within IHL, given the obligation to respect and protect 
the wounded and sick alike, with no hierarchy posed between the two conditions.111 Further, the 
extensive literature on the reverberating effects to be considered in an attack include resulting disease 
and ill-health within the assessment, without any discernible difference to the consideration of the 
resulting injuries.112  
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ii. Mental Health  
 
The right to health, as contained within the ICESCR, contains within it the right to the  highest attainable 
standard of mental health.113 However, the extent to which IHL adequately protects this right is 
questionable, demonstrating a potential significant  lacuna within IHL. Following from the discussion 
above, it is evident that the physical manifestations of harm are to be included within the scope of 
Articles 51 and 57, regardless of whether they arise from disease or physical injury. Nevertheless, a 
continuing debate exists on whether the obligations arising from these provisions extend to the impact 
on the mental health of the civilian population. 
 
Notably, IHL contains a number of provisions that explicitly address the psychological well-being of 
civilians as well as combatants.114 Article 51(2) of the Protocol itself contains a prohibition on ‘acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.’ The 
prohibition of terror appears provides an attempt to curtail attacks that attempt to cause mental 
suffering.115 Though ICL, in the Galić case, the appeals chamber held that the war crime involved 
‘extensive trauma and psychological damage being caused by attacks [which] were designed to keep 
the inhabitants in a constant state of terror.’116 However, the Tallinn Manual states that this provision 
can only be used by analogy to support the inclusion of mental health in the proportionality assessment 
and precautionary measures, and that it is therefore unclear as to whether mental health impacts should 
be necessarily included.117 The fact that this prohibition only addresses acts where “the primary purpose 
of which” is to terrorize the civilian population has been invoked both in favour of and against the 
relevance of incidental mental harm for the principle of proportionality. Whilst arguing in favour one can 
say that this demonstrates a desire to protect the mental well-being of the civilian population, one may 
in turn respond that incidental impacts on their mental well-being is therefore excluded, and outside of 
the ambit of the rules of targeting.                                                                                                                                                                                
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Though mental harm is not explicitly contained within the rules on proportionality nor precautionary 
measures, one cannot necessarily infer that such an omission was intentional, and that as such mental 
harm was specifically excluded. Given the absence of any real clarity on the scope of ‘injury’, and 
coupled with the general lack of awareness of mental health generally, the conversation remains open. 
Certainly, as we gain a more robust understanding of the physical aspects of mental health issues, the 
distinction between such disorders and ‘physical’ harms appears arbitrary. Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of negative impacts on the mental health within proportionality assessments has been criticised as 
practically impossible to implement, given the difficulties in practically measuring the resultant impacts 
as well as the difficulties in assessing how susceptible an individual is to mental health impacts.  As 
variables such as genetic makeup and experiential background are all active factors in whether mental 
health issues will arise or their resultant severity, some contend that this will be impossible to foresee 
in any meaningful way.118 However, this contestation fails to address the fact that the proportionality 
equation does not necessarily seek to assess whether an attack was proportionate after the fact, but 
rather, seeks to be preventative in nature. As such, research can help to identify the likelihood of 
detrimental mental health impacts, particularly with the type of effect, such as the volume of noise, or 
historical observations on the ways in which civilian populations respond to methods and means of 
warfare, such as drone strikes.119 Additionally, the myriad of variables are somewhat addressed by the 
fact that the decision-maker only needs to consider the information that is feasibly attainable.120 
Nevertheless, in certain instances, military personnel may be able to identify where an effect will have 
a particularly severe impact on the mental well-being of civilians, such as where children may be present 
(as they will likely be more susceptible to trauma, for instance). Should mental health be excluded from 
the protections conferred under API this will ultimately present a significant gap in IHL, in a manner that 
is at odds with the protections conferred within IHRL. 
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Chapter 3 - ESC Rights in IHRL 
 
a. ESC rights in IHRL 
 
While ESC rights are contained within a number of international legal instruments and national 
constitutions, they are perhaps best encapsulated within the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (henceforth, the ‘ICESCR’ or ‘the Covenant’). In safeguarding the rights 
contained, the Covenant’s language and the subsequent discussions on the contours of State parties’ 
obligations have identified a number of constituent features. Primary among these is the position that 
ESCR are to be progressively realised by the State. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR holds that States must 
take steps to the maximum extent of their available resources for the progressive achievement of the 
rights contained in the Covenant, providing an avenue by which States are granted some degree of 
latitude, including in difficult situations such as during armed conflict.121  
 
In charting the contours of State obligations, one may look towards the interpretations of the substance 
of the ICESCR, made by the CESCR, the human rights treaty monitoring body with responsibility for 
overseeing the ICESCR. Whilst, non-binding, the General Comments produced by the CESCR have 
helped to put flesh on the bones of the Covenant, providing substantive  guidance recommendations 
for their interpretation and scope. 
 
The actual scope of the duty to progressively realise ESC rights was elaborated on by the CESCR 
within General Comment 3.122 Here, they emphasised that the concept of progressive realisation should 
not be read in a way that holds ESC rights as merely aspirational. Rather, the obligation to progressively 
realise ESC rights demands the active effort to take necessary steps to the maximum of its available 
resources, demanding that the State moves expeditiously and effectively towards the realisation of such 
rights.123 In this respect, these efforts ‘should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible’ 
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to meet the obligations set out in the Covenant.124 Even within the context of armed conflicts, the 
CESCR has found that the obligation to progressively realise ESC rights remained in place.125  
 
Moreover, though Article 4 of the ICESCR allows States to limit ESC rights, where these limitations are 
determined by law, to the extent that they are ‘compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for 
the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.’ Despite this, the limitation of 
‘survival rights’ such as the rights to food and health, are not necessarily considered derogable, as the 
limitation of these rights is not seen as necessary to protect or restore public order.126 As such, States 
hold obligations in relation ESC rights that cannot be simply displaced by the presence of an armed 
conflict. 
i.  Minimum core obligations  
 
Beyond the obligation to progressively realise ESC rights, the CESCR has explicitly and continuously 
held that the rights put forward in the ICESCR contain minimum core obligations, that must be 
immediately realised.127 The minimum core obligations that represent the minimum levels of ESC rights 
differ across the nature of the right. They present a standard under which no limitation or derogation 
can be allowed. The minimum core obligations refer to the need to ensure at the very beginning the 
minimum essential levels of the rights set out in the Covenant.128 Further, as laid out in General 
Comments 14,129 15130, 17131 and 19,132 the core obligations pertaining to these rights are non-
derogable, and as such must be consistently ensured and upheld. While States may be tempted to 
argue in a manner that reflects the derogation provisions included within the legal framework 
surrounding civil and political rights, that the  exceptional circumstances must allow for some deviation 
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from the full protection of certain rights, the CESCR has adamantly maintained that the minimum core 
obligations continue to remain in force in situations of armed conflict, emergency and natural disaster.133 
Despite this, derogations in relation to labour rights during conflict and acute crisis are largely accepted 
by the international community (including the CESCR), though in this respect, labour rights appear to 
bear a closer relation to civil political rights than other ESC rights.134  
 
The CESCR has addressed the respect of the ICESCR during armed conflict, and States’ measures to 
take steps to improve the enjoyment of the rights contained within it. In doing so they have posed 
questions to States on the active measures they have taken to protect these rights, asking the Afghan 
government on their measures to ensure children’s access to educational services within the worsening 
security situation;135 whether the transitional justice process in Colombia gave sufficient weight to ESC 
rights and whether schools were adequately protected from occupation by armed groups;136 and asking 
the government of the DRC to realise (at the very least) the core minimum obligations of the ICESCR, 
including within the conflict affected eastern provinces.137 We can therefore recognise the importance 
that ESC rights have during conflict, and that the mere existence of an armed conflict does not erase 
the substantive obligations of the State. The State obligations associated with the core content of the 
rights to health, food, housing, access to water or to education, even within instances of armed conflict 
or acute crisis remain in effect. 
 
Within their general comments the CESCR has identified the minimum core obligations including the 
responsibility to ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services without discrimination, 
and with a pariticular need to ensure this in repect to vulnerable or marginalised groups; the need to 
ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, and to ensure 
freedom from hunger; the obligation to ensure access to basic housing, shelter and sanitation, as well 
as an adequate supply of safe and potable water and water facilities; to provide essential drugs; the 
equitable distribution of health facilities, goods and services; to adopt and implement a periodically 
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reviewed public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, that 
address the health concerns of the entirety of the population, and is devised through a participatory and 
transparent process. Such strategies/plans must include indicators and benchmarks to facilitate the 
measurement of progress; the monitoring of the realisation of the right to water; the obligation to take 
measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring access to 
adequate sanitation; the obligation to ensure that personal security is not threatened when having to 
physically access to water;138 Within conflicts, vulnerable and marginalised groups may emerge, or 
existing group’s vulnerabilities exacerbated. The additional attention conferred within the minimum core 
obligations can therefore provide a considerable asset for securing the protection of such populations. 
ii. Prohibition of retrogressive measures  
 
The obligation to progressively realise ESC rights impliedly contains a prohibition on retrogressive 
measures limiting the attainment and protection of the rights delineated in the Covenant. This restriction 
has been recognised by the international law community, and presents a significant safeguard for ESC 
rights generally. Any exception would have to be justified against certain strict criteria. Retrogressive 
measures are measures that, whether directly or indirectly, cause a backsliding on the rights contained 
within the Covenant. The CESCR has stated that deliberate retrogressive measures  ‘require the most 
careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided 
for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.’139 The mere 
existence of an armed conflict or acute crisis will not in-and-of-itself allow for the utilisation of 
retrogressive measures. The CESCR commented in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
that whilst the prevalence of armed conflicts presented significant obstacles to the State, the decrease 
of resources dedicated to health services and social protection was an issue of concern. Ultimately, the 
CESCR found that the mismanagement of international aid and the disproportionate funding of defence 
to the detriment of health and social protection funding was a violation of their obligations under Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR, regardless of the presence of a continuing conflict.140 Here, one can locate the 
onus on States to provide such justifications. Within conflicts where measures may be taken that 
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actively harm the ESC rights achieved, it demonstrates a precaution against wanton measures and a 
need to ensure that the issue is carefully considered and justified. 
 
iii. Maximum available resources 
 
Under the ICESCR, States have an active obligation to use the maximum available resources to secure 
the rights laid out in the Covenant. While this does not create strict spending guidelines for ESC 
considerations, States must be able to demonstrate that they have made use of the resources available 
to meet the minimum core obligations of the Covenant at the least. In doing so, they must demonstrate 
that they are allocating resources to progressively realise the rights contained in a manner that ‘guards 
against retrogressive steps or impacts and at least maintain the status quo for a broader range of human 
rights obligations.’141 As such, States are unable to contend that the resource constraints arising from 
conflict and crisis situations prevent them from dedicating funding to the ESC rights arising within their 
jurisdictions whilst allocating inordinate amounts to their defence budget. This duty therefore reinforces 
States’ obligations to engage in proactive measures to secure and protect ESC rights which require 
specific attention and direct action. 
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Chapter 4 - Relationship between IHL and IHRL 
    
a. How do IHRL and IHL interact? 
 
As demonstrated above, IHRL and IHL provide distinct obligations. The two legal frameworks sit 
alongside in conflict, and can complement each other, elaborating the series of responsibilities that 
arise in conflict situations. However, difficulties arise when the legal frameworks conflict, leading to 
careful consideration as to which framework will act as the primary guide.142 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has looked towards this question on several occasions, namely, 
the Nuclear Weapons143 and the Wall144 Advisory Opinions as well as DRC v Uganda.145 The issue has 
received attention within the European Court of Human Rights,146 the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,147 and the Human Rights Committee.148 The first substantive discussion of the subject took 
place within Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. Here, the ICJ held that the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights continues to apply in conflict (whilst permitting derogations in line with Article 
4). However, in situations where human rights obligations differ with those provided for by IHL, they 
held that the lex specialis (the law governing the specific subject matter) will prevail.149 In these 
situations, the legal framework that is designed to cover the particular situation will act as the primary 
law. 
 
In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court provided more substantive guidance on the issue. It held that 
three possible situations cover the relationship between IHL and IHRL. Firstly, there may be situations 
in which ‘rights may be exclusively matters of [IHL].’ Secondly, there may be occasions in which IHRL 
                                               
142 Murray, D., et al., Practitioners' Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), p.79. 
143 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, ICJ, 8 July 
1996,(hereafter ‘Nuclear Weapons’) para.25. 
144 Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, ICJ, 9 July 2004, (hereafter ‘the Wall’), para 106. 
145 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), ICJ Report 2005, ICJ, p.116 19 
December 2005, (hereafter, ‘DRC v Uganda’) para.216. 
146 Hassan v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, App. no. 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014), para.96-107.  
147 E.g. Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, IACtHR, 15 September 2005, para. 115; Serrano Cruz v. El-
Salvador, Preliminary Objections, IACtHR, 23 November 2004, paras. 112–13.  
148 UN Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para.11. 
149 Nuclear Weapons, note 144. 
32 
is the sole governing regime.  Thirdly, situations may arise in which rights may be matters of both IHL 
and IHRL.150 However, the Court failed to provide a methodology for determining how a situation can 
be siloed within one of these categories.151 Despite this failure to provide clear guidance, the court 
recognised IHL as lex specialis, while acknowledging that ‘the protection offered by human rights 
conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict (though, again, the court accepted the possibility 
of derogations under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966).152 
Additionally, the Court paid explicit attention to ESC rights,153 stating that the ICESCR can apply to 
‘territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises 
territorial jurisdiction,154 which is directly relevant to situations of occupation that are provided for within 
IHL. In this case, the Court rejected Israel’s argument that the ICESCR did not apply in relation to the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories due to ’the well-established distinction between human rights and 
humanitarian law under international law’155 and held that a State’s obligations are not suspended 
merely as a result of the existence of an armed conflict.156 Rather, the obligations provided for within 
the ICESCR are read in light of IHL and are extended to populations under their jurisdiction as a result 
of occupation.157 
 
The ICJ’s DRC v Uganda judgment returned to the question of the relationship between IHL and IHRL, 
and ultimately adopted a different approach to the previous ICJ cases. Though the case referred to the 
Wall opinion, no reference was made to the concept of lex specialis. Rather, the Court found ‘that both 
branches of international law, would have to be taken into consideration.’158 This acted to provide an 
approach that refused to ‘displace’ one body of law in favour of the other, regardless of the lex specialis 
principle. While one framework may ultimately used  as an ‘initial reference point’159 both IHL and IHRL 
are able to guide the nature and scope of legal obligations. However, like the Court in the Wall opinion, 
the ruling did not state their methodology for identifying when IHL or IHRL operates as the primary 
framework covering the situation, nor did they outline whether the violation at hand was a violation of 
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human rights due to the fact that the killings in the case were also in violation of IHL, or whether they 
found that the violation occurred independently of the violation of IHL.160 Nevertheless, the DRC v 
Uganda case represented a clear shift towards the principle of concurrent application, emphasising the 
position and role of human rights law within armed conflict situations. 
 
The reasoning within the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court have 
taken a similar trajectory. After having adopted a stringent lex specialis model within Coard et al v United 
States that placed a premium on IHL within conflict,161 they began to recognise the co-application of 
IHL and IHRL. Here, they held that ‘the specificity of the provisions of [IHL] do not prevent the 
convergence and application’ of IHRL as contained within the American Convention and other sources 
of international law.162 The Court has since outlined their methodology for determining the nature of the 
interaction between the two frameworks. In the Case of Afro-Descendent Communities Displaced from 
the Cacaria River Basin (Operation Genesis) v Colombia, the Court held that given that the facts took 
place within a non-international armed conflict, the treaty-based obligations should be read in a manner 
that complements IHL, recognising the specificity of IHL in governing situations of NIAC.163 Moreover, 
it is also the case that the two frameworks will be used to specify the scope of obligations within 
conflict.164 
 
Ultimately, on the basis of the case law highlighted above, it can be gleaned that the first step in 
identifying the applicable legal framework will be to look towards the rules either specific to the situation 
(as per the language of the Inter-American Commission and Court and the Human Rights Committee) 
or the rules designed for the given situation (as per the language of the ICJ and the European Court of 
Human Rights).165 The laws of targeting will rely on IHL as the primary framework in active hostilities as 
a result. Nevertheless, IHRL, though interpreted through IHL in targeting, will nevertheless remain active 
and applicable in contributing to and informing the appropriate legal framework.166   
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b. Does extraterritoriality impact the usefulness of IHRL in conflict settings? 
 
Given the State based focus of IHRL, jurisdiction is of primary importance in determining when IHRL is 
applicable.167 Whilst some scholars have attempted to find human rights obligations on the part of non-
state armed groups,168 this is outside the scope of this work. As such, this work is concerned with the 
obligations of State actors, confined to conflicts within their territorial jurisdiction. In this respect, the 
IHRL obligations that are identified will be relevant for international and non-international in which a 
State is fighting within its own borders or in areas within their effective control, or in situations of 
occupation in which the State holds IHRL obligations.169 Wider discussion on extraterritorial obligations, 
whilst pertinent and are of particular interest in respect to ESC rights, these issues will not be considered 
within this work. 
 
c. The Law of Targeting and IHRL  
 
IHRL also creates its own obligations during targeting processes. Even within situations of active 
hostilities, human rights obligations can apply rigorous standards. Whilst the case law on such issues 
is drawn from civil and political rights, IHRL will ultimately act to reinforce the IHL principles on 
targeting.170 Here, given the vagueness of the requirements of the precautionary measures within IHL, 
we can turn to the better delineated requirements within IHRL to help elucidate the content of military 
obligations. Whilst the group of experts who adopted the ‘Manual on International Law Applicable to Air 
and Missile Warfare’ contended that IHRL has only a minimal influence over targeting decisions as a 
result of the lex specialis principle, in which IHL is dominant, this section highlights that this interpretation 
may fail to adequately address the development of the law towards the concurrent application approach. 
In turn, it is put forward that IHRL must be active during the targeting process in armed conflicts and 
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can be deployed in a manner that complements IHL, while recognising that IHL will act as the guiding 
regime.171 
 
Importantly for the purposes of charting military obligations to proactively gather information, militaries, 
where necessary and feasible, should conduct supplementary investigations to develop a full 
understanding of the circumstances.172 This can entail the obligation to obtain, among other information, 
information on the presence of civilians within the area. This ultimately, echoes the position put forward 
by Droege that militaries may have an obligation to obtain additional information (and in the absence of 
such information may need to refrain from an attack)173 and demonstrates that militaries cannot simply 
shop short of collecting a wider set of information, where they are in a position to actively expand their 
knowledge. Further, in operationalising this knowledge, information should be actively communicated 
between military personnel, with the Isayeva case mandating the communication of information on the 
presence of civilians within the area to avoid the accidental targeting of such civilians.174 Beyond this, 
additional technical support measures can be required, such as arranging the presence of forward air 
controllers to assist in identifying civilians where they may be present within the area.175 
 
In selecting the means and methods of warfare used in an attack, IHRL creates a similar list of 
obligations. For instance, in operational planning, IHL is bolstered by the obligation in IHRL for militaries. 
Militaries should seek to ‘avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the risk of loss of life’ to 
those directly targeted as well as civilians,176 though the obligation to avoid the death of combatants is 
not present within IHL. Further, the means used within an attack, must take into account the likelihood 
of incidental damage.177 In the planning of the attack, there also exists an obligation to consider the 
potential actions of the hostile actors, and in this sense look towards the effects of an attack that exists 
beyond the initial effect of their immediate targeting decision. Here, militaries, in planning an ambush, 
need to take the potential response of the hostile actors into account, such as the threat of civilians 
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being caught in the responsive fire of the targeted party.178 However, the obligation to engage in 
proactive measures, or detailed planning of the attack is dependent on the time available to engage in 
such activities.179 Where the opportunity to conduct such efforts is present but not implemented the 
failure to do so will likely amount to a violation of human rights law.180 Importantly, IHRL also requires 
active communication and the monitoring of the operational environment in active hostilities, thereby 
increasing the level of civilian protection, by developing the ability to respond to the dynamic nature of 
the battlefield, or to allow for unanticipated risks to be communicated to the targeting decision-
makers.181  
 
Drawing from these obligations articulated in IHRL case law helps to clarify the nature of requirements 
placed on militaries during the targeting process and the planning of operations. As such, using the 
principle of the concurrent application of IHRL and IHL, we can see that IHRL actively reinforces the 
provisions within IHL and provides a legal basis for the obligation to proactively engage in activities, 
such as the gathering of additional information and use of technical measures, to better respect the 
humanitarian principles of IHL and IHRL. Whilst the case law cited above is grounded in civil and political 
rights, such measures could be equally required to respect ESC rights. Even without the moniker of 
ESC rights, the right to life within civil and political rights can echo ESC rights that entail existential 
components such as the right to health and the right to water.182 For this reason, it is argued that to 
properly respect these rights, the measures required on the part of military actors should extend to 
capturing the reverberating effects related to issues such as the spread of disease, degradation of water 
systems and limitations on the ability of the population to access healthcare services. 
 
On a practical level, the application of IHRL alongside IHL within targeting practices will allow for more 
intensive third party inspection of the legality of targetings, as affected persons are able to bring cases 
before international bodies. Given that States will need to justify their decision making through the 
production of evidence,183 increased accountability may improve decision-making more generally by 
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making them more wary of adverse findings, or through the increased ability of claimants before bodies, 
given the dearth of judicial bodies dealing primarily in State compliance with IHL. 
 
d. Reverberating effects in IHRL 
 
Despite IHL operating as the primary framework for targeting in active hostilities, international human 
rights law can still influence the proportionality assessment when measuring whether incidental death 
or destruction resulting from the attack outweigh the military advantage to be gained.184 In reviewing 
such cases, courts have placed weight on a variety of human rights issues, relating to the concern that 
affected property is essential for the livelihood of the civilian population,185 whether displacement will 
occur as a result of the destruction of the property186 whether an attack may interfere with the right to 
respect for the home,187 the cultural significance of the targeted property,188 and respect for the 
environment.189 Nevertheless, whilst such issues will need to be considered, they will still be balanced 
with the anticipated military advantage, thereby allowing severe infringements on such rights within 
active hostilities.190 
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Chapter 5 - The Operationalisation of ESC rights in targeting practices 
 
a. Existing suggested models 
 
Though not hinged on ESC rights, Bothe has put forward a model that intended to confer wide 
protections to populations during humanitarian interventions, in a manner that would confer particular 
protections to the ESC rights of the populations, whilst remaining grounded in jus ad bellum (the law 
covering States’ right to use force). Bothe contended that the humanitarian objectives of humanitarian 
intervention would influence the application of IHL.191 Under this approach, Bothe argued that the 
humanitarian aims would therefore create limits on the objects that States would be permitted to target. 
Given the widespread destruction and significant impacts on the ESC rights of the civilian population in 
Kosovo resulting from the NATO campaign,192 this approach could potentially provide better for the 
civilian population. However, Bothe’s position is legally inarguable, as such an argument would would 
conflate the distinct rules IHL and jus ad bellum, which do not interact in the same manner as IHL and 
IHRL but, rather, are entirely separated.193   
 
Beyond this, Müller states that given the ICJ’s insistence that IHRL continues to apply in armed 
conflicts,194 the minimum core obligations contained within ESC rights should be respected within 
military targeting decisions, as any other interpretation would entirely erase States’ obligations under 
the ICESCR.195 Here, Müller argues that the targeting of certain ‘dual-use’ objects such as 
transportation infrastructure or electricity networks may prohibit States from meeting their core 
obligations outlined within General Comment 14, such as the disruption of immunisation campaigns or 
the delivery of essential drugs or equipment.196 Moreover, it is asserted that States have an obligation 
to provide access to the minimum right to health services in a more sustainable manner than through 
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the provision of humanitarian assistance after the cessation of active hostilities. Resultantly, the 
foreseeable effects of the long-term deterioration of health services over the course of hostilities should 
be included within proportionality analysis, even where IHL acts as the guiding legal framework, due to 
the co-application of IHL and IHRL.197 
 
Central to this argument is the position that where the minimum core obligations have been met, 
limitations and retrogressive measures that affect this minimum level are only permitted for ‘the purpose 
of promoting general welfare in a democratic society.’198 However, limitations for reasons of national 
security and public order are not justifications in and of themselves allowed.199 Further, derogations that 
take the State below the minimum core obligation levels  are not allowed through Article 4 of the 
ICESCR.200  
 
Within the concurrent application approach to the relationship between IHL and IHRL, any tensions 
between the two legal frameworks should be read in a manner that allows for the complementary 
application of the two frameworks, though the legal framework that specifically covers, or is designed 
for, the issue will act as the primary reference point. Following this reasoning, Müller correctly identifies 
such a tension within the law of targeting under IHL, given the absence of IHRL principles such as the 
minimum core obligations as contained within the ICESCR. It is therefore necessary to attempt to read 
the two frameworks in a mutually complementary fashion, with the provisions of IHRL being used to 
reinforce and flesh out the provisions within IHL. Müller contends, using the right to health as the focal 
point, that the minimum core obligations demands the provision of certain key services (here the 
creation and maintenance of ‘a basic health care system that ensures individuals’ physical and 
economic access to essential primary health care independently and in a sustainable manner.201 This 
obligation, she argues, remains active within the law of targeting, and will act to inform the interpretation 
of IHL within this realm, both in terms of the definition of military objectives and the principle of 
proportionality, given the lack of clarity concerning these issues within IHL scholarship.202  
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Müller puts forward a position that seeks to integrate minimum core ESC rights as provided for by the 
ICESCR within the targeting process in order to minimise the long-term impacts of conflict on public 
health.203 However, such reasoning may be extrapolated and deployed across ESC rights as minimum 
core obligations have been identified and crafted by the CESCR across the spectrum of ESC rights. By 
utilising such an approach, Müller holds that IHL can still act as the dominant framework within active 
hostilities, whilst still embedding IHRL in a manner that is compliant with the concurrent application 
framework, providing substance to grey areas within the provisions themselves.204 
 
This argument nevertheless remains difficult to reconcile with the active hostilities/security operations 
dichotomy, under which IHL will act as the guiding framework in active hostilities, whilst IHRL be the 
primary reference point in security operations.205 While it is accepted that IHRL continues to apply in 
conflict settings, within active hostilities, specific provisions within IHL will act as the primary guiding 
framework where it is sufficiently clear. In doing so, we must recognise that rights that will apply 
otherwise (such as a combatants right to life) can be displaced by the IHL rules on targeting. When 
viewed within this light, Müller’s position that the minimum core obligations and the prohibition on 
retrogressive measures will create standards that must be respected, even where the armed group has 
the ability to target an object under IHL, is perhaps too optimistic. This thesis puts forward the position 
that within the attack itself, the fundamental formula of the proportionality assessment will remain 
unchanged.206 Through the ability to engage in actions that would otherwise violate the rights of the 
civilian where it is commensurate with the military advantage, it is therefore evident that IHL specifically 
covers this issue in a manner that cannot incorporate the minimum core obligations of IHRL, though 
they will continue to apply outside of this specific instance of active hostilities. However, IHRL can 
influence the procedure of the attack, and in doing so, create obligations to develop and incorporate the 
impacts on the ESC rights of the population within the targeting procedure, thereby influencing the 
ultimate calculation of whether to conduct or minimise the harms resulting from an attack. Within this, 
the specific obligation to maintain the minimum core obligations will mandate the consideration of these 
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base-line rights at the very least, but they will remain balanced against the anticipated military 
advantage. 
 
b. Proactive obligations to expand awareness 
 
As discussed above, given the absence of guidance on the level of information that is to be relied upon 
in identifying what an attacker ‘may expect’ in terms of the death and injury of civilians and damage to 
civilian objects, as well as the obligation to proactively seek information on these issues, a number of 
conflicting interpretations have emerged. This appears to indicate a lack of specificity within IHL on this 
area, and as such, it may be beneficial to consider the co-application of IHRL. As such, IHRL can help 
to provide a practical basis for determining the issues that a military is to consider as well as their 
proactive obligations in obtaining information on the effects of an attack that impact the rights of the 
civilian population. Moving forward, this thesis will consider the obligations that stem from ESC rights 
to determine how they may influence the application of the law in this area, relying on the ICESCR as 
well as the guidance provided by the CESCR. 
 
Military attacks that impede and degrade the ESC rights of the population must involve the ‘most careful 
consideration’ of the rights affected.207 Within the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources, one may read an obligation to actively gain information on these impacts, creating a positive 
obligation to understand and appreciate the extent and nature of the reverberating effects of an attack, 
and a duty to expend resources in attempting to garner such information. As a result of this obligation 
within IHRL to expend the maximum available resources in upholding ESC rights, States (and indeed 
militaries) are limited in their ability to argue against the need to develop methods to identify the effects 
on ESC rights resulting from conflict, particularly where they cause the degradation of systems to a 
level below the minimum core obligations..208 
 
As referred to above, the ability to take the full range of ESC rights into account during targeting is 
limited by the API. In this respect, beyond specific provisions that limit the targeting of cultural property 
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or the use of means and methods of warfare that compromise the right to water, for instance, the 
proportionality test and precautionary measures are restricted to issues that are potentially existential 
in nature or include actual physical (and, as argued here, psychiatric) harm. Nevertheless, expanding 
the protection of this limited number of ESC rights can provide significant protection to the civilian 
population, whilst relying on the narrow number of specific provisions for the aspects of civilian well-
being that are not necessarily survival or physical well-being related in nature, such as cultural fulfilment. 
With this in mind, the primary focus will remain on ESC rights that pertain to the civilian population’s 
physical well-being, such as the rights to health and water. 
 
The CESCR’s General Comment 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
emphasises the need for States to engage in individual and joint efforts to ‘make available relevant 
technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data collection on a disaggregated 
basis.’209 Similarly, General Comment 15 on the right to water, holds that ‘States parties should monitor 
and combat situations where aquatic eco-systems serve as a habitat for vectors of diseases wherever 
they pose a risk to human living environments.’210 These obligations require the establishment of active 
diligence measures to better appreciate and monitor where an attack will affect the right to health or 
water.211 Of note, however, is that - at least in relation to the right to health - this does not just occur at 
the level of what they may expect at present, but to actively expand their awareness and understanding 
of the knock-on impacts, utilising and advancing technological measures to develop these abilities. 
 
The CESCR has held that States parties should avoid ‘limiting access to, or destroying, water services 
and infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example, during armed conflicts in violation of international 
humanitarian law.’212 As such, we can see that the obligations derived from the ICESCR do not merely 
rest at the level of national policy, but also exist at the military level. As such, militaries retain the 
obligation to respect the rights contained within. However, the phrasing of this particular 
recommendation makes it appear that ESC rights entail negative obligations on the part of militaries. 
These negative obligations require certain positive actions in order to be properly achieved, particularly 
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given that the avoidance of limiting access to or destroying water services and infrastructure relies not 
only on intuitive knowledge, but significant expert knowledge and an awareness of systems developed 
through the gathering of specific information.213 
 
This approach can actively complement the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL in a manner that 
honours the current trajectory of international case-law. This approach would require the establishment 
of procedures outside of an active hostilities setting. For this reason, it retains a practical value, 
understanding that such diligence procedures are not necessarily possible to conduct in the heat of 
combat, but should, rather, be diffused through military and State processes in order to inform military 
targeting measures in combat when they occur. In instilling this ability to utilise epidemiological 
surveillance and more general monitoring of impacts on the rights to health and water, States would 
ultimately need to harness expert knowledge and incorporate it within their processes. Moreover, 
beyond enhancing their technical awareness of the knock-on effects of an attack, the need to collect 
epidemiological data on a disaggregated basis and to understand where waterborne diseases ‘pose a 
risk to human living environments,’ including the specific obligation to do this within combat situations, 
would necessarily require a robust understanding of the human terrain within an operational 
environment.214 In obtaining this information, an intersectional approach to individual vulnerability to 
such disease would need to be collected. As such, one may look towards the specific vulnerabilities of 
community groups, including gender, class, irregular migrant status amongst others, to identify where 
they will be particularly vulnerable. For instance, in patriarchal communities (which is to say, most 
communities) women may be culturally expected to perform the majority of informal medical care work 
or water collection and cleaning.215 In this respect, their level of interaction with persons with disease 
or contaminated water supplies may be higher, therefore making them particularly susceptible to harm. 
This should ultimately inform any military’s assessment of the possible effects of an attack, allowing 
them to understand the parameters of harm, and ascertaining the exact manner in which they may 
manifest (particularly where they compound additional existing vulnerabilities). 
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To reiterate, these obligations will not result in a fundamental rebalancing of the proportionality 
assessment, as any expected civilian death or injury, and any civilian property destruction will still be 
measured against the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage. Regardless, by expanding 
military’s obligations to obtain information on the impacts of an attack, and to develop a sufficiently 
intersectional approach to allow for the full appreciation of its effects, one can better ensure that a 
meaningful balancing of the harms and military advantage has been conducted.  
 
Moreover, the obligation to actively expand their understanding of the effects of an attack remains 
compatible with the belief of States that targeting decisions should be based on information at hand 
during the time of attack216 or the requirement for information that is ‘reasonably available’ at the time 
of the attack.217 This is due to the fact that the obligation to expand their awareness of the reverberating 
effects of an attack will require the establishment of processes to gather or process relevant information 
within their targeting systems. In doing so, the information at hand during an attack and the information 
that is reasonably available will be expanded. This can be through the training of military personnel on 
the knock-on effects of an attack (including understanding the interplay of central features of 
infrastructure), the inclusion of expert personnel such as engineers or public health experts within 
targeting decision making or the development of assessment measures for the operational environment 
that are able to adequately capture the nuances of communities as well as the assessment of where 
harms may arise and compound. Moreover, the selection of military targets is often conducted prior to 
the actual attack. Military actors frequently draft lists of the likely targets in a military campaign, 
assessing the legality of the attack and vetting them for future. When engaging in such efforts, it appears 
eminently feasible to include ESC rights within this vetting process, given the greater amount of time 
available, a more detailed level of information can be acquired and expert opinion can be factored into 
the decision-making process.218 This will be particularly relevant in situations where complex 
infrastructural networks are involved, or where the manifestation of harm across vulnerable 
communities may require a deep-dive into the ways in which a knock-on effect will materialise.  
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Rogers has attempted to define the ‘reasonably available,’ holding that it is contingent on the information 
that is available at the time, and whether this information indicates that additional information is required 
from other sources.219 Additionally, as outlined above, a number of military manuals demand the active 
collection of information to best understand the incidental damage that arises from an attack, echoing 
the requirements stipulated by the ICRC.220 Such manuals outline a requirement to assess the 
concentration of civilians, the nature of the urban environment (including settlements and shelters), the 
natural environment, and protected objects such as ‘medical units, cultural objects, [and] installations 
containing dangerous forces.’221 Nevertheless, these manuals do not make explicit reference to a need 
to obtain information on the interconnectedness of infrastructure and services, or the spread of disease 
within the area, for example.222 In this sense, it is important to consider what level of information is 
required, i.e. whether the military may simply rely on obtaining information on the location of 
infrastructure, facilities and supply networks, such as upstream infrastructure (such as treatment plants 
and energy production facilities) and downstream infrastructure (such as the supply and communication 
lines).223 Whilst this information is obtainable (through military intelligence or publicly available sources 
like the internet), it leaves the question of whether the military merely needs to understand the presence 
of these facilities, or whether additional technical information is required on the likely effects of their 
damage or destruction. The Tallinn Manual recognises that mission planners may not have the 
necessary expertise to understand the nature and effects of a cyber-attack on the civilian population.224 
To address this issue, the Manual recommends the inclusion of technical experts into the decision-
making and planning possible, where feasible, to ensure that adequate precautionary measures have 
been taken.225 The duty to monitor impacts on ESC rights, as identified by the CESCR, will require 
attention to be paid to these issues, as they underline individuals’ ability to avail of such rights. Where 
they are impacted by armed conflict scenarios it is therefore necessary that these measures should be 
collected in these scenarios. Where such information has been collected under IHRL obligations, they 
will then be readily available for military personnel, and States would have a duty to forward this 
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information to militaries in order to instil some level of protection of ESC rights in areas under their 
effective control. 
 
The operationalisation of ESC rights in military targeting practices is of interest for capturing the 
reverberating effects of an attack. Of particular interest here is the question of what one ‘may expect’ 
as a result of an attack. Here, one can ascertain that States have an obligation to actively expand their 
understanding of the reverberating effects, ‘using and improving’ their epidemiological surveillance and 
data collection. Further, the IHRL framework regarding ESCR creates a number of additional obligations 
for States. This involves the duty to assess the state of enjoyment of ESC rights, including ensuring 
adequate mechanisms to collects and assesses relevant and suitably disaggregated data.226  
 
c. Recommendations 
 
There are a number of ways in which militaries can seek to better protect ESC rights in conflict in a 
manner that respects their responsibilities under both IHL and IHRL whilst maintaining a practical lens. 
The following list provides a demonstration of some of the ways in which this can be achieved, though 
it does not seek to provide an exhaustive list of measures.  
 
i. Scope of ‘injury’ 
 
Ambiguity within the definition of injury within Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol potentially leave room 
for the exclusion of important aspects of civilian well-being, primarily non-fatal disease and mental harm. 
Under the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL approach, IHRL can be used to inform the entailing 
rules of the laws of targeting especially where such ambiguity is prevalent.227 In this respect, the explicit 
reference to the right to health (including mental health) within the ICESCR points to a need to include 
such issues within targeting practices228 helping to elucidate the scope of the provisions in a manner 
that complements and is influenced by IHRL. As such, militaries should seek to include assessments 
on these impacts within their proportionality assessments and precautionary measures. Though it is 
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noted that such information may be difficult to ascertain at times, a problem which has been suggested 
as eminently challenging in respect of mental health, it is certainly possible to rely on historical 
observations to assist in such determinations. Here, one can observe, for instance, the typical 
psychological impacts of means and methods of warfare such as drone strikes229 on the civilian 
population and filter this into their decision on the choice of means and methods used to achieve their 
military goals. 
 
ii. Target and ‘No-strike’ lists  
 
At present, militaries frequently develop no-strike lists, highlighting a list of objects that should not be 
targeted within military campaigns. These are prepared in advance of targeting, therefore allowing 
considerable analysis (including legal analysis) of potential attacks.230 In this respect, instructing Judge 
Advocates General to pay due attention to the reverberating effects of an attack within the State’s 
interpretation of IHL and IHRL can help to protect critical infrastructure and other objects that are 
essential for the fulfilment of the ESC rights of the population. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
targeting list of the US military was frequently amended, with files sent back as JAGs felt that more 
information was required.231 This demonstrates that establishing such a vetting process can help to 
enrich humanitarian concerns within the targeting process. These lists should attempt to anticipate 
potential and likely violations of ESC rights, and the development of such lists should include robust 
analysis of reverberating effects. Given that these lists are to be completed well in advance of the 
targeting itself, they would allow for the inclusion of technical and expert voices in the process. As such, 
expert opinion from public health experts and engineers (among other such expert voices) should be 
included within such processes, through the increased scrutiny of targeting decisions, and positive 
suggestions of alternative and less disruptive or reckless means. For example, Israel has also created 
a ‘sensitive site’ list, marking objects protected under IHL, as well as those that ‘warrant special 
consideration for policy reasons’.232 As such, even without creating explicit no-strike lists, militaries can 
highlight the sensitivity of key infrastructure or other pertinent sites that may have an impact on the ESC 
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rights of the population, therefore allowing military personnel to be attuned to the significance of such 
sites. 
 
iii. Training  
 
Whilst the full appreciation of the reverberating effects of an attack may require expert knowledge, 
militaries should seek to train personnel on the typical reverberating effects of attacks in a manner that 
is appropriate to the circumstances of the environment. For instance, this may be on the health risks of 
the destruction of water systems and infrastructure. Given the practical difficulties in fully communicating 
these issues, it is certainly possible to provide base level trainings, in increasing depth as personnel 
increase in rank. This can embolden the knowledge available at the time at both the subjective and 
objective levels, through training the individual and expecting a modicum of knowledge from a 
‘reasonable’ commander. Further, it appears feasible to provide training to personnel (including 
weapons controllers) on easily identifiable infrastructure, such as infrastructure that is identifiable from 
the air.233 Whilst it may be difficult or resource and time intensive to provide training to such personnel 
on the reverberating effects of attacks on such infrastructure, it will at least allow this information to be 
easily communicated throughout the targeting process and in doing so, will help to better inform the 
decision making process and account for potential effects on the ESC rights of the population. 
 
In 2010, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs highlighted the creation of new written procedures 
requiring Humanitarian Affairs Officers to be assigned in every combat unit, from battalion level or 
higher. Such Humanitarian Affairs Officers were to be tasked with the provision of advice and 
educational activities for commanding officers and soldiers in relation to the protection of civilians, 
civilian property and importantly, infrastructure, as well as humanitarian measures, such as the planning 
of assistance and documentation of humanitarian safeguards.234 By embedding such focal points into 
combat units, training can not only be diffused, but also, individual advice provided to commanders, and 
even soldiers more easily.  
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iv. Collection of information  
 
The basic layout of infrastructure and services systems should be obtained where feasible. This may 
be through the ready identification of visible installations, such as water treatment plants,235 through 
gaining expert opinion from engineers specialised in urban services (e.g. water or power supplies) or 
through obtaining information of the layout  though the final option will be potentially difficult even with 
the luxury of time.236 It is of note, that (as highlighted above) the Israeli Minister of Defence stated the 
need to conduct research on, identify and mark existing infrastructural systems in the planning of an 
attack.237  As this requirement was said to include infrastructure pertaining to a number of ESC rights, 
the extension of such an obligation across militaries would be a valuable asset in protecting ESC rights 
across conflicts generally. 
 
Further, by liaising with stakeholders, such as local authorities, humanitarian organisations and 
militaries, it may be possible to gain information on the typical impacts of attacks.238 The information 
held by such bodies, particularly in regards to civil society groups and humanitarian agencies may also 
be accessible through open-source materials.239 This may be particularly helpful in obtaining information 
on the resilience of the community, and their mode of interaction with services, for example, whether 
the community tends to have access to personal water tanks. The duty under IHRL to pay particular 
attention to vulnerable and marginalised communities will also mandate the collection of information on 
their susceptibility to harm. Where this information is collected, it will help to inform analysis of how the 
effects of an attack will manifest, and the extent of incidental harm that is likely to be caused. 
 
Beyond this, the ICRC’s guidance on the information that should be collected in the preparation of an 
attack has proved influential.240 However, in its current form, the requirements appear to relate primarily 
to the first-tier impacts of an attack, i.e. the direct causation of civilian death. Though some of the 
requisite information may be used to foresee the reverberating effects of an attack, such as the natural 
environment and the nature of built up areas, these requirements may be bolstered to more explicitly 
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cover long-term impacts. For instance, it may create obligations to collect information on infrastructure 
within built up areas, or vulnerabilities of the civilian population. Should such guidance be developed, 
this would hopefully act as a lobbying point in improving military intelligence gathering, pushing forward 
the protection of ESC rights within conflict zones. 
 
v. Collateral Damage Estimation Methodologies   
 
As highlighted above, one of the ways in which militaries may seek to operationalise ESC rights within 
their targeting processes is by including the reverberating effects of an attack within CDM. Nevertheless, 
at present CDM systems place an emphasis on the first-tier impacts of an attack.241 However, in order 
to include the reverberating effects, the historical observations may include effects of the ESC rights of 
populations as a result of previous attacks, or empirical data on the vulnerabilities of the population or 
the potential emergence of threats to ESC rights (for example of the potential spread of disease within 
the environment). Additionally, the ICESCR requires States to make available relevant technologies, 
such as epidemiological surveillance242 it could be possible to adopt these indicators within military 
practices. Moreover, humanitarian agencies, have developed methodologies to capture the 
vulnerabilities of the population, including within conflict zones.243 Similar approaches may be utilised 
by militaries in capturing this information. Further, communication between military and humanitarian 
actors can ensure that the rights impacts (often addressed in more detail by humanitarian actors) are 
communicated to the military, therefore expanding military awareness in a resource effective manner. 
In this sense, the analysis of communities’ level of vulnerability, or the potential spread of disease, can 
help to inform the decision making process through the utilisation of indicators on issues such as food 
or water security, or even the precarity of a population’s access to health services. Whilst CDM is not 
necessarily used as a proportionality assessment tool in-and-of-itself, by helping to identify the effects 
of an attack it can help decision-makers identify means and methods that are the least harmful to the 
civilian population, thereby improving humanitarian protection within attacks.244 
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vi. Means and methods of warfare 
 
As discussed above, States have an obligation to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and methods of attack in order to avoid or minimise incidental harm to the civilian population.245 The 
use of explosive weapons in urban areas has the potential to cause significant first-tier harm, as well 
as costly impacts on ESC considerations, such as the effects on civilian health and essential services.246 
Given the scale of harm that can result from such practices, armed groups should prohibit the use of 
explosive weapons within urban environments, these attacks should be avoided on the basis that they 
will be inherently indiscriminate and in past practice have had disproportionate impacts on the civilian 
population.247 It is of note that the use of explosive weapons poses threats not only in the immediate 
term, through the infliction of death upon intended detonation, but also poses a significant threat well 
after the attack, in terms of the degradation of services and infrastructure as well as leaving explosive 
remnants within urban environments that may detonate uncontrollably later.248  
 
vii. Battle damage assessment 
 
At present, militaries, such as the US military, order assessments to be completed following an attack.249 
Whilst this is currently restricted to the immediate impact of the attack, the expansion of this 
assessment, both geographically and temporally, may allow for lessons to be learned. The long term 
impacts of hostilities are currently being conducted by NGOs and UN agencies, and can perhaps be 
relied upon by militaries, or they choose to conduct such assessments themselves. In doing so, the 
knowledge gained can help build an experiential knowledge-base, and direct the minds of military 
personnel towards the importance of the reverberating effects of military actions. Further, the collected 
information can help to improve existing processes. As highlighted above, CDM includes historical 
effects of their attacks, the collected information can therefore aid their CDM measurements, or 
                                               
245 API, Article, 57(2)(a)(ii). 
246 ICRC, ‘Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Humanitarian, Legal, Technical and Military Aspects. 
Switzerland: Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting in Chavannes‐ de‐ Bogis,’ Report, 2015, pp.14-16. 
247 ICRC, ‘International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts,’ Report, October 
2011, Doc. 31IC/11/5.1.2, pp. 40–42. 
248 Robinson & Nohle, note 40, p.115. 
249 Cross, K., et al, ‘Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: technical considerations relevant to their use and 
effects,’ Armament Research Services,2016, Report, p.46. 
52 
analogue decision-making through the collection of quantitative and qualitative information on the 
effects of an attack on the civilian population through time. 
 
vii. Rules of Engagement  
 
Whilst it is accepted that within active hostilities, the threats that are captured must ultimately relate to 
civilian death and injury or damage of civilian property. However, it is nevertheless recognised that 
attacks may have severe repercussions on aspects of well-being that are not inherently tied to these 
considerations, such as their social fulfilment or economic well-being. Additionally, the nexus between 
such impacts and conflict has been recognised by militaries, and are increasingly tied into military 
practices.250 Though this would not arise from an obligation derived from IHL, militaries may choose to 
develop rules of engagement that better respect the ESC rights of the population.251 
 
Müller, in developing the argument of Haines, states that the obligations stipulated by the ICESCR to 
provide the swift reconstruction of civilian infrastructure to allow for the resumption of civilian life as 
soon as possible after the cessation or winding-down of conflict, can influence the interpretation of what 
constitutes a ‘military objective.’ Here, it is argued that what constitutes a military objective, in that its 
‘partial or total destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time,’ in relation 
to the ‘definite military advantage’ gained should be read in light of the reconstruction obligation.252 
 
Haines emphasises that such post or late-conflict reconstruction activities will be essential for the overall 
success of a military campaign.253 Haines asserts that as a result, the post-combat phase will influence 
and potentially restrict the active combat phase. Here, he argues, the requirements of the post-combat 
phase must be considered alongside those of the immediate combat, influencing how one can 
understand ‘military advantage.’ For instance, where the targeting of essential infrastructure may 
provide a short-term and momentary military advantage, this advantage may manifest as a distinct 
disadvantage where it undermines future reconstruction efforts and the ability of the community to 
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resume normal life, that necessarily will follow the active stages of the conflict. Importantly, Haines does 
not argue that this requirement to include long-term considerations into the determination of what 
constitutes a military advantage arises out of legal obligations, arising from the concurrent application 
of IHL and IHRL. He nevertheless does not exclude this possibility and identifies the emergence of a 
moral requirement to operate in this manner.  
 
Nevertheless, this position can be potentially problematic. The extension of ‘military advantage’ to 
include long-term considerations, can have adverse consequences for humanitarian protection. The 
widening of the temporal scope of military advantage can allow decision-makers to justify almost any 
action on the basis that they will achieve some nebulous wider advantage, such as winning the military 
campaign.254 For this reason, phrasing the obligation in terms of a need to expand the temporal scope 
of a military advantage should be avoided, and instead, the need to include post and late conflict 
reconstruction, should be included within military process in a very explicit manner that concerns 
reconstruction specifically without leaving room for militaries to subvert the humanitarian protections 
conferred by the law. 
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Conclusion 
 
As international opinion and jurisprudence shifts towards the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL in 
armed conflict, the tools for strengthening the protection of civilians in armed conflict are increasingly 
expanded. Further, increasing awareness of, and humanitarian concern for, the long-term impacts of 
conflict has meant that militaries are better able to embed these issues within their targeting practices, 
utilising technological innovations and a wealth of expert knowledge. The argument made throughout 
these pages has been that the collection of such information, as required by IHL and IHRL, can help to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of an attack, capturing the impacts across time and 
space. Though some have contended that the non-derogability of survival rights may create legal 
obligations for States to refrain from attacks that would violate the minimum core obligations tied to ESC 
rights, this position is ultimately fragile. Whilst these issues will filter into decisions, and will feature 
highly in the humanitarian side of the proportionality scale, they will remain tempered by the anticipated 
military advantage. In this respect, the sometimes clinical practicality of IHL will continue to allow for 
serious infringements on the ESC rights of the population within active hostilities. Further to this, States 
do not have a legal obligation to weigh the non-survival rights of the population against the expected 
military advantage, leaving a significant gap in the protection of the ESC rights of the population, and 
leaving us to rely on the specific provisions that specifically cover these areas, such as the provisions 
on the targeting of cultural well-being, to protect these features of civilian well-being. This is particularly 
important where developing literature, particularly in respect to the concept of human security and 
counter-insurgency theory, has increasingly recognised the nexus between human fulfilment and the 
outbreak of conflict. Nevertheless, the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL can prove of some 
assistance here by bolstering the argument that negative impacts to mental health should be included 
within the proportionality assessment and precautionary measures.  
 
With these issues in mind, the obligation to incorporate the need to protect ESC rights into targeting 
procedures prior to the proportionality assessment itself is perhaps the best way in which we can protect 
the long term safety and respect for civilians. The obligation provided for by the complementary 
application of IHRL and IHL to actively expand awareness, develop technologies and ensure training 
and active communication (among other such strategies), can allow for reverberating effects to be 
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captured by military analysis. Once such information has been brought to their attention, it should factor 
into proportionality assessments, mandating military advantages be particularly strong to justify a 
targeting decision. This ultimately reflects the ways in which proportionality confers protection, through 
the development of procedural safeguards. It will remain difficult to challenge targeting, as it will always 
involve some degree of subjective weighing of immeasurable concepts (civilian harm and military 
advantage), nevertheless, we can ensure that the actual civilian harm is properly accounted for and 
considered. 
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